Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear University	of	Nebraska–Lincoln mclear@unl.edu August	26, 2015 Forthcoming	in	Gomes	&	Stephenson	(eds.) Kant	and	the	Philosophy	of	Mind How	is	it	possible	to	intuit	something a	priori? An	intuition	is	a	representation	of	the sort	which	would	depend	immediately	on	the	presence	of	an	object. It	therefore seems	impossible	originally	to	intuit a	priori, since	then	the	intuition	would	have	to occur	without	an	object	being	present, either	previously	or	now, to	which	it	could relate, and	so	it	could	not	be	an	intuition. Prolegomena, 4:281-2.* Introduction R ECENTLY THERE HAS BEEN a	resurgence	of	interest	in	the	details	of	Kant's	theory	of	empirical intuition	and the significance	of these	details for	understanding	Kant's views on	cognition	and	his	transcendental	idealism	more	generally.1 One	presumption	of much	of	this	work	is	that	empirical	intuitions	"immediately	present"	their	objects	to	a	perceiving subject. Kant	does	repeatedly	talk	of	the	"immediacy"	of	intuition, and	does	so	in	relatively	cannonical	contexts	(A19/B33, A68/B93, A320/B376–7; JL 9:91), but	it	is	not	obvious	which, if	any, position	in	the	philosophy	of	perception	Kant	takes	to	be	entailed	by	this	commitment	to	immediacy. However, in	the	secondary	literature	on	Kant's	notion	of	(empirical)	intuition, we	typically see	at	least	one, and	perhaps	all	three	of	the	following	notions	in	play. First, that	there	is	no inference, on	the	part	of	the	subject, in	the	perceptual	act	of	apprehension. Second, intuitions present	their	objects	immediately	in	the	sense	that	there	is	no	mental	intermediary	to	which	the subject	is	related, and	in	virtue	of	which	the	subject	is	able	to	perceive	her	environment. Finally, and	perhaps	most	controversially, that	intuitions	present	their	objects	immediately	in	the	sense that	one	cannot	have	the	relevant	intuition	(be	it	inner	or	outer)	without	there	being	something which	is	thus	intuited, and	which	is	thereby	made	present	to	the	subject's	consciousness. It	is this	last	relational	and	existential	conception	of	immediate	presence	that	has	proved	the	most controversial.2 1 See	McDowell	(1996), McDowell	(1998a); Hanna	(2005); Allais	(2007); Allais	(2009); Hanna	(2011a); Roche	(2011); Allais	(2011); Gomes	(2014). 2 For intentional	object	and	representationalist readings	of	an	object	as	being	"immediately	present"	which	would deny	the	existence	claim	see	Sellars	(1968); Aquila	(1983); Pereboom	(1988); Aquila	(2003); Haag	(2007); Aquila (2008); Watkins	(2008); Grüne	(2009); Watkins	(2012); Stephenson	(2015). See	Allais	(2009); Allais	(2011); Gomes (2014); McLear	(2016b)	for	discussion	of	"relationalist"	readings	of	Kant. For	readings	that	attempt	to	combine	both representational	and	relational	elements	see	McDowell	(1998b); Hanna	(2005); Hanna	(2008); McDowell	(2013). 1	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear In this	paper I explicate the	notion	of "presence" [Gegenwart] as it	pertains to intuition. Specifically, I examine	two	central	problems	for	the	position	that	an	empirical	intuition	makes	an object	immediately	present	in	the	controversial	third	sense	–	viz. as	an	immediate	relation	to	an existing	particular	in	one's	environment. The	first	stems	from	Kant's	description	of	the	faculty	of imagination	as	providing	intuitions	in	the absence of	their	objects, which	might	suggest	that	the notion	of	"presence"	linked	to	that	of	intuition	does	not	require	the	actual	occurrent	existence	of what	is	so	presented. The	second	problem	stems	from	Kant's	discussion	of	hallucination, since	if things	with	the	subject	were	mentally	the	same	whether	she	was	perceiving	an	object	or	merely hallucinating, the	object	itself	could	not	be	said	to	be	immediately	present	to	her, as	the	reading requires. I shall	suggest	that	Kant's	writings	indicate	at	least	one	possible	means	of	reconciling	our	two problems	with	a	conception	of	"presence"	such	that	perceptual	and	hallucinatory	states	might be	understood	as	mentally	distinct	kinds	of	states	–	i.e. as	different	kinds	of	intuition	–	rather	than as	intuitions	of	the	same	general	kind, and	which	differ	only	in	terms	of	their	causal	etiology. This may	not	be	sufficient	to secure the	relationalist's	claim	that	intuition	is	an	immediate	relation	to an	existing	particular	in	one's	environment, but	it	does	show	that	opposition	to	this	claim	will require	further	argument. Section	one	discusses	the	issue	of	presence	with	respect	to	intuition	in	greater	detail. Section two	articulates	challenges	that	Kant's	remarks	on	imagination	and	hallucination	present	for	the relational	and	existential	reading	of	"presence". Section	three	then	examines	the	textual	and philosophical	basis	for	defending	the	relational	claim. 1 Intuition	&	Presence In	the	"Stufenleiter"	passage	from	CPR (A320/B376–7)	Kant	defines	an	intuition	as	a	kind	of "singular"	[einzeln]	and	"immediate"	[unmittelbar]	representation	that	is	"conscious"	[bewusst] and	has	relation	to	an	object	[Gegenstandsbezug].3 Several	interpreters	have	taken	the	general	notion	of	"immediacy"	here	as	a	kind	of	presence to	the	mind, as	is	characteristic	in	perception. Call	this	notion	of	presence	"phenomenological presence". Charles	Parsons	and	Lucy	Allais	have	both	advanced	variants	of	this	view.4 One	might	think	that	the	criterion	of	"immediate	relation	to	objects"	for	being	an intuition	is	just	an	obscure	formulation	of	the	singularity	criterion. But	it	evidently means	that	the	object	of	an	intuition	is	in	some	way	directly	present	to	the	mind, 3 Cf. A19/B33, A68/B93, A320/B377, A713/B741; JL 9:91; MM 29:800, 888; VgM 29:970-3; VL 24:905. I shall assume	throughout the	rest	of the	paper that the	immediacy	of intuition	is	distinct from	its	singularity. Intuitions are	also	supposed	to	be, unlike	sensations	[Empfindungen]	or	mere	"feelings"	[Gefühle], objective, in	the	sense	of relating	to	some	object. So	objectivity	may	be	a	necessary	condition	as	well. For	further	discussion	see	Grüne	(2009); McLear	(2014). For	Kant's	distinction	between	sensation	and	feeling	see	CJ 5:189, 203-6. 4 Other	such	proponents	include	Bird	(2006), 119; Hanna	(2008), Hanna	(2011b). August	26, 2015 2	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear as	in	perception, and	that	intuition	is	thus	a	source, ultimately	the	only	source, of immediate	knowledge	of	objects.5 it	seems	to	me	that	Kant	thinks	that	perception	of	empirically	real	objects	involves those	objects	being	directly	present	to	consciousness, without	mental	intermediaries: it	involves	being	in	representational	mental	states	which	essentially	involve the	(empirically	real)	object	as	constituents.6 Both	Parsons	and	Allais	link	the	notion	of	immediacy	to	the	other	characteristics	of	intuition	by way	of	appeal	to	our	(contemporary)	notion	of	a	conscious	experience. An	empirical	intuition immediately	relates	to	its	object	in	just	the	sense	that	a	conscious	experience	has	the	characteristic	phenomenology	of	immediately-i.e. non-inferentially, and	without	the	presence	of	any intermediary-presenting	something	for	apprehension	by	a	conscious	subject. The	notion	that	intuition	involves	no	intermediary	might	be	taken	in	one	of	two	ways. According	to	the	first	way, a	subject's	awareness	of	an	object	O does	not	hold	in	virtue	of	their awareness	of	any	other object O′. According	to	the	second	way, one's	awareness	of	an	object O does	not	hold	in	virtue	of	a	further psychological	state, which	one	must	also	occupy, which may	or	may	not	itself	be	a	form	of	awareness. I take	it	that	the	conception	of	phenomenological presence	construes	this	presence	as	non-inferential	and	immediate	in	only	the	first	of	these	two senses.7 In	§8	of	the Prolegomena Kant	links	the	concept	of	an	intuition	to	the	presence	of	its	object. How	is	it	possible	to	intuit	something a	priori? An	intuition	is	a	representation	of the	sort	which	would	depend	immediately	on	the	presence	of	an	object. (Pr	4:281; cf. B72) It	is	the	conceptual	link	between	intuition	and	the	presence	of	its	object	that	motivates	Kant's discussion	of	the	seemingly	problematic	nature	of	a	priori	intuition. The	apparent	implication	is that	the	dependence	of	an	intuition	on	a	present	object	is	supposed	to	be	incompatible	with	the idea	that	an	intuition	could	be	a	priori, for	in	such	a	case	Kant	says	the	a	priori	intuition	would "precede" the	object itself and	do so "originally" (4:282). Kant's framework for articulating this	problem	seems	to	depend	on	interpreting	"presence"	[Gegenwart]	as	entailing existence. Though	Kant	is	not	explicit	about	this, the	problem	he	seems	to	be	aiming	to	articulate	is	one according	to	which	an	intuition	(in	its	empirical	sense)	is	taken	to	be	one	produced	by	a	present 5 Parsons	(1969), 112. 6 Allais	(2011), 380. 7 It	is	compatible	with	the	immediacy	of	intuition, as	I have	construed	it	here, that	it	be	the	product	of	mental	processes; cf. Allais	(2009), 394-5. However, this	is	not	yet	to	say	that	intuition	is	the	product	of synthesis. For	argument	that we	should	not	construe	intuition	as	the	product	of	synthesis	see	Allais	(2009); Tolley	(2013); McLear	(2014), McLear (2015); TODO:	cite	Allais	(this	volume). For	contrasting	arguments	see	Longuenesse	(1998); Grüne	(2009). August	26, 2015 3	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear object, while	an	a	priori	intuition	(if	such	there	be)	would	be	one	that	is not produced	by	any object. In this	Kant	appears to	be	making	a	claim that	parallels	his	use	of	"original" in the Transcendental	Deduction	to	describe	the	status	of	the	transcendental	unity	of	apperception. I call it [i.e. self-consciousness] the pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from	the	empirical	one, or	also	the original	apperception, since	it is that	selfconsciousness	which, because	it	produces	the	representation I think, which	must be	able	to	accompany	all	others	and	which	in	all	consciousness	is	one	and	the same, cannot	be	accompanied	by	any	further	representation. (§16, B132) The	connection	of	"original"	with	production	would	seem	to	require	that	there	exist	something that	does	the	producing. If	that	is	correct, then	in	the Prolegomena passage	that	we've	been considering	Kant	would	then	be	asking	how	there	could	be	a	priori	intuition	which	would	"originally"	precede	but	nevertheless	productively	depend	on	something's	subsequent	existence? As Kant	goes	on	to	explicitly	ask, in	the	last	sentence	of	§8, "how	can	the intuition of	an	object precede	the	object	itself?" (4:282). That	is, how	could	an	intuition	which	productively	depends on	the	existence	of	its	object, also	precede, in	the	sense	of	not	productively	depending	on, the object	it	is	supposed	to	be	an	intuition	of? An	"a	priori	intuition"	thus	seems	like	a	contradiction	in	terms.8 A natural	reading, then, of	§8	is	that	it	conceives	of	intuition	as, by	definition, dependent	on	an	existing	object, which	is	the	origin	or	ground	of	the	intuition, and	uses	this definition	to	motivate	the	problem	of	a	priori	intuition.9 We	might	then	conceive	of	intuition	as follows: Strong	Presence-Dependence	(SPD): If	a	subject	S intuits	an	object	O at	a	time	T,	then	O exists and	is	suitably	related	to	S at	T10 According	to	SPD,	whenever	one	has	an	intuition, there	is	something	actually	existing	that	one intuits. So, in	the	case	of	an	outer	empirical	intuition, one	only	has	an	outer	intuition	when there	is	an	actually	existing	object	which	is	present	to	one	in	the	intuition	of	it. SPD is	thus incompatible	with	an	account	of	intuition	that	includes	hallucinations, imaginings, memories, or	dreams	in	the	class	of	possible	outer	intuitions. Attributing	SPD to	Kant	thus	brings	with	it	a	high	explanatory	cost, for	it	might	seem	natural to	include	one's	veridical	perception	of	a	red	ball, one's	hallucination	of	a	red	ball, and	one's memory	of	a	red	ball	as	all	belonging	together	in	the	mental	kind outer	intuition, since	they	are 8 Thanks	to	Anil	Gomes	for	encouraging	clarity	on	this	point. 9 This	is	how	the	passage	is	taken	by	Allais	(2010, 59). Hanna	(2001), 210	also	construes	intuition	as	clearly	dependent on	an	existing	object. 10 The	notion	of	a	suitable	relation	here	is	meant	to	be	broad	enough	to	accommodate	various	notions	of	the	reliance of	sensibility	on	"affection", and	is	easily	thought	of	here	in	straightforwardly	causal	terms. In	the	latter	case	we should	construe	this	relation	as	excluding	issues	concerning	deviant	causal	chains	leading	to	the	occurrence	of	a perception. August	26, 2015 4	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear all, at	least	in	a	phenomenological	sense, "spatial"	representations. SPD must	deny	this. Only the	successful	perception	of	the	red	ball	counts	as	an	outer	intuition. The	other	states, though perhaps	phenomenologically	similar, are	nevertheless	not	outer	intuitions. However, Kant	goes	on, in	the	passage	from	§8	of	the	Prolegomena, to	significantly	weaken his	initial	claim	by	saying	that, It	therefore	seems	impossible	originally	to	intuit a	priori, since	then	the	intuition would	have	to	occur	without	an	object	being	present, either	previously	or	now, to which	it	could	relate, and	so	it	could	not	be	an	intuition	(Pr	4:281-2; my	emphasis) Here	Kant	indicates	that	an	intuition	only	depends	on	the	actual	presence	of	of	an	object for	the	initial	intuition, but	not	necessarily	for	subsequent	ones. This	suggests	a	weaker	sense	in which	an	intuition	might	depend	on	its	object. Moderate	Presence-Dependence	(MPD): If	a	subject	S intuits	an	object	O,	then	either	O exists at	T and	is	present	to	S,	or	did	exist	at	some	time	prior	to	T and	was	present	to	S MPD is	compatible	with	an	imagining	or	a	hallucination	counting	as	an	intuition, so	long	as what	was	imagined	or	hallucinated	was	actually	intuited	at	some	prior	point. Interestingly	though, Parsons	and	Allais	seem	divided	as	to	whether	it	is	SPD or	MPD that correctly	characterizes	Kant's	view. Parsons	seems	to	concede	that, Imagination	being immediate in the required sense [of	phenomenological	presence], immediacy	of	a	representation	does	not	imply	the	existence	of	its	object	at all.11 Clearly	then, Parsons	does	not	think	that	intuitions	are	strongly	dependent	on	the	existence	of their	object, if	cases	of	imagination	instantiate	just	the	same	kind	of	"immediate	presence"	as cases	of	veridical	perception. In	contrast, Allais	holds	that	an	empirical	intuition	"essentially involves	the	object"	as	a	constituent.12 This	requires	the	SPD reading	of intuition, since	the intuited	object	must	obviously	exist	if	it	is	to	be	a	constituent	of	the	mental	state. 2 Problems	with	Presence Though	both	interpretive	options, SPD and	MPD,	have	a	textual	and	philosophical	basis	in	Kant's work, they	also	stand	in	at	least	prima	facie	tension	with	other	aspects	of	Kant's	account	of	the sources	and	nature	of	intuition. There	are	three	significant	hurdles	to	interpreting	intuition	as dependent	on	an	existing	object. The	first, and	most	obvious, is	that	though	a	priori	intuition	is 11 Parsons	(1992), 83. 12 Allais	(2011), 380. I have	argued	for	a	similar	position. See	McLear	(2016b), §5.2. August	26, 2015 5	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear also	a	singular	and	immediate	representation	of	an	object	(viz. space	and	time), the	object	so presented	does	not	exist. These	a	priori	intuited	objects	are, according	to	Kant, ens	imaginaria –	imaginary	beings	(A291/B347; cf. MFNS:	Preface, 4:467; Mrongovius	Metaphysics (1782-3), 29:820), and	Kant	emphasizes	this	as	his	argument	in	the Prolegomena continues. There	is, therefore	only	one	way	possible	for	my	intuition	to	precede	the	actuality of the	object and	occur as an a	priori cognition, namely if it contains	nothing else except the form	of sensibility, which in	me as subject precedes all actual impressions	through	which	I am	affected	by	objects. (4:282; original	emphasis). A fully	satisfactory	account	of	the	relational	nature	of	intuition	would	have	to	explain	the	pure case	as	well	as the	empirical. Unfortunately, I lack	the	space	required	to	elaborate	such	an account	here.13 Bracketing	this	issue	concerning	a	priori	intuition, we'll	examine	the	two	further issues	–	viz. imagination	and	hallucination, both	of	which	concern empirical intuition, in	the following	subsections. 2.1 Imagination	&	Presence SPD is clearly threatened	by	Kant's account of the faculty of imagination [Einbildungskraft] and	its	capacity	to	generate	intuitions	without	the	presence	of	the	object. For	example, in	the Anthropology, Kant	introduces	the	faculty	of	imagination	[Einbildungskraft]	as	a	subfaculty	of sensibility.14 Sensibility in	the	cognitive	faculty	(the	faculty	of	intuitive	representations)	contains two	parts: sense and	the power	of	imagination. The	first	is	the	faculty	of	intuition in	the	presence	of	an	object, the	second	is	intuition	even without the	presence	of an	object. (An	7:153; cf. 7:167; B151; MM 29:881; VM 28:449; DM 28:673) Though	Kant	again	puts	things	in	terms	of	"presence"	here, the	implication	seems	to	be	that	sensibility	generates	intuitions	only	of	existing	objects, while	imagination	generates	intuition	even in	the	absence	of	an	existing	object. If	this	is	correct	then	Kant's	conception	of	the	imagination as	an	intuition-producing	faculty	is	clearly	a	problem	for	any	account	of	presence	in	terms	of the	current	existence	of	its	object. The	suggested	view	would	then	take	intuitions	as not after	all 13 I think	that	the	most	promising	strategy	for	a	general	account	is	to	distinguish	between	existence	[Existenz or Dasein] and	actuality	[Wirklichkeit]. All	intuitions	are	relations	to	actualities, but	not	all	intuitions	are	relations	to	existences. Kant	actually	makes	such	a	distinction	at	R 6324, 18:647	(between	1790	and	1793), specifically	naming	time	and space	as	actualities	but	not	existences. Obviously, this	requires	further	discussion. On	the	cognitive	role	of	intuition see	McLear	(2016b); McLear	(2016a). 14 Kant's	definition	of	the	imagination	and	its	powers	is	not	unusual	for	the	time. See, e.g. Baumgarten	(2013), §§557-8. August	26, 2015 6	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear dependent	on	the	presence	of	the	object	they	bring	before	the	mind. Intuitions	would	then	be merely	self-standing	representations	that	may	or	may	not	correspond	to	some	existing	object.15 The	threat	is	perhaps	tempered	somewhat	by	Kant's	distinction	between	an	"original"	[ursprünglich]	or	"productive"	[productiv, dichtend]	faculty, and	one	which	is	merely	"reproductive"	[reproductiv, zurückrufend]	(7:167-8).16 For	example, the	productive	imagination	is	partially	responsible	for	the	a	priori	representation	of	space	and	time, while	reproductive	imagination	allows	a	subject	to	sensorily	recall	past	presentations. So, on	this	line	of	thinking, in	the case	of	intuiting	a	spatial	object	in	vision	or	touch, the	empirical	intuition	does	indeed	seem	to depend	on	the	presence	of	that	object, as	an	object	of	outer	sense, at	some	point	in	the	subject's history, rather	than	its	being	a	total	fabrication	of	the	mind. However, when	we	ask why the	status	of	one's	present	mental	state	as	an	intuition	might depend	on	a	past	state	of	intuiting	an	outer	object, things	no	longer	seem	so	straightforward. The	problem	is	that	the	existence	of	a	present	intuition, as	generated	by	the	imagination, seems to	depend	not so	much	on the	particular existence	of some	previously intuited object as it does	on the (previous)	presentation	of sensory	properties	characteristic	of	our	experience	of empirical	objects. Kant	makes	this	clear	in	his	discussion, in	the Anthropology, of	the	limits	of the	productive	imagination. The power of imagination (in other words), is either inventive (productive) or merely recollective (reproductive). But the productive power of imagination is nevertheless not exactly creative, for it is not capable of producing a sense representation	that	was never given	to	our	faculty	of	sense; one	can	always	furnish evidence of the	material of its ideas. To one	who has never seen red among the	seven	colors, we	can	never	make	this	sensation	comprehensible, but to	the person	who	is	born	blind	we	cannot	make	any	colors	comprehensible, not	even the secondary	colors, for	example, green, which is	produced from the	mixture of two colors. Yellow and blue	mixed together give green; but the power of imagination	would	not	produce	the	slightest	idea	of	this	color, unless	it	had seen them	mixed	together. This	is	exactly	how	it	is	with	each	one	of	the	five	senses, that is, the sensations	produced	by the	five senses in their synthesis cannot	be made	by	means	of	the	power	of	imagination, but	must	be	drawn	originally	from the	faculty	of	sense. (An	7:167-8)17 15 Roche	(2011), 361	argues	that	Kant's	remarks	on	imagination	pose	a	problem	for	understanding	intuition	as	dependent on	the	presence	of	an	object	which	it	presents. See	also	Makkreel	(1990), chs. 1-2; Haag	(2007), 256-64; Grüne (2009), 41-3; Stephenson	(2015). 16 Things	are	actually	more	complicated	than	this, as	Kant's	notion	of	a	faculty	of	imagination	covers	various	subfaculties, which	have	different	cognitive	roles, and	which	are	controlled	by	a	greater	or	lesser	degree	by	the	will. See	Satura (1971), 113-141	for	discussion. 17 Kant	makes	something	like	this	argument	in	a	variety	of	places. For	example, in	his	discussion	of	skepticism	in	the A-edition	Fourth	Paralogism	(A373-5), Kant	argues	that	it	would	not	be	possible	to	simply imagine the	entirety	of	the August	26, 2015 7	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear What	this	suggests	is	that	though	the	imagination	cannot	truly	originally	generate	any	sensory quality, it	can	combine	anything	to	which	it	has	been	exposed. If	we	understand	objects	as ordered	complexes	of	properties	then	the	imagination	seems	capable	of	producing	any	object	it can	assemble	from	given	sensory	material. This	would	suggest	that	an	intuited	object	need never have	existed, but	only	the	sensory	material	from	which	it	is	"assembled". One	might	intuit	(via imagination)	an	object	which	one	has	never	before	encountered	by	combining	various	sensory characteristics	which	one has previously	encountered	(e.g. a	red	cube	and	a	green	sphere)	into some	new	object	(e.g. a	red	sphere).18 This	might	also	explain	why	Kant	refers, further	on	in	the Prolegomena §8	passage	to	the	presence	of	an	object	"either	previously	or	now	to	which	the intuition	could	relate." (4:281) Kant's	view	of	imagination	both	explains	why	there	might	be	a	dependence	relation	of	current	intuition	on	past	circumstances, and	what	exactly	it	is	about	one's	past	circumstances	that was	important	–	viz. the	exposure	to	sensory	qualities	that	the	imagination	could	not	generate on	its	own. What	this	suggests is that the	though	the	imagination	cannot	generate	any	truly original sensory	quality, it	can	combine	anything	to	which	it	has	been	exposed. If true, this results	in	an	even	weaker	form	of	presence-dependence. Weak	Presence-Dependence	(WPD): If	a	subject	S intuits	an	object	O,	then	either	O exists	at T and	is	suitably	causally	related	to	S,	or	the	sensory	qualities	characteristic	of	O were instantiated	and	suitably	related	to	S at	some	time	(or	times)	prior	to	T With	WPD in	view, it	is	difficult	to	see	how	there	could	be	textual	evidence	which	might	support	Kant's endorsing	MPD over	WPD.	Kant's stated	commitments regarding the	nature	and capabilities	of	the	imagination	support	WPD over	MPD.	His	view	of	imagination	both	explains why	there	might	be	a	dependence	relation	of	current	intuition	on	past	circumstances, and	what exactly	it	is	about	one's	past	circumstances	that	was	important	–	viz. the	exposure	to	sensory qualities	that	the	imagination	could	not	generate	on	its	own. This	is	not	yet	to	say	that	Kant endorses	WPD over	SPD,	but	rather	that	MPD is	not	a	stable	intermediary	position. spatial	world, since	the	imagination	could	not	simply	produce	such	representations	without	being	originally	exposed to	them	(cf. R 5400, cited	in	Caranti	(2007), 33-4). Even	Descartes	seems	to	agree	with	this, noting	in Meditation	I that	"[certain	simple	kinds	of	qualities]	are	as	it	were	the	real	colours	from	which	we	form	all	the	images	of	things, whether	true	or	false, that	occur	in	our	thought"	(AT 7:20). Though	Descartes	goes	on	to	doubt	our	capacity	to	know even	such	basic	qualities	given	the	possible	existence	of	an	evil	deceiver, it is	notable	that the	deceiver	must	be something	other	than	ourselves, in	order	to	account	for	all	the	richness	and	variety	of	what	we	experience	(however, see Meditation	VI (AT 7:77), where	Descartes	wonders	whether	there	could	be	some	hidden	faculty	in	ourselves producing	all	of	our	ideas). Cf. Baumgarten	(2013), §559. 18 For	a	similar	conclusion	see	Stephenson	(2011), §1, and	Stephenson	(2015), §§3-4. Note	that	Stephenson	argues	for what	he	calls	"General	Affection	Dependence"	via	considerations	concerning	information-processing	and	sensation. However, as	is	apparent	from	the	above	discussion, we	can	get	to	a	version	of	this	position	via	very	general	consideration	of	Kant's	discussion	of	the	faculty	of	imagination, rather	than	any	more	specific	appeal	to	the	representational status	of	sensation	or	to	human	sensibility	as	an	"information-processor." August	26, 2015 8	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear 2.2 Hallucination	&	Presence There	are	other texts	which	cause further, though	not	dissimilar, problems	for	an	account	of presence	in	terms	of	existence. Perhaps	the	most	notable	of	these	is	the	following	remark	of Kant's	in	the	Refutation	of	Idealism. From	the	fact	that	the	existence	of	outer	objects	is	required	for	the	possibility	of	a determinate	consciousness	of	our	self	it	does	not	follow	that	every	intuitive	representation	of	outer	things	[jede	anschauliche	Vorstellung	äuserer	Dinge]	includes	at the	same	time	their	existence, for	that	may	well	be	the	mere	effect	of	the	imagination	(in	dreams	as	well	as	in	delusions)...(B278-9; cf. A376; Pr	4:290). This	passage	might	be	taken	to	suggest	that	there	can	be	outer	intuitions	without	outer	objects and	that	the	issue	of	whether	an	intuition	presents	anything	actual	is	settled	only	with	respect to, e.g., the	experience's	coherence	with	Kant's	causal	criterion	of	actuality.19 If	true	then	the passage	seems	a	clear	counterexample	to	an	existence-based	view. One	issue	with	this	text	is	that	Kant	does	not	explicitly	refer	to	outer	intuitions, but	only	to	the "intuitive	representation	of	outer	things." It	is	not	clear	whether	an	intuitive	representation	of	an outer	thing	is	the	same	as	an	outer	intuition.20 However, given	the	reference	to	the	imagination, it	seems	rather	plausible	that	Kant	is	not	indicating	a	new	category	of	representation	(i.e. the category	of intuitive	representation), but	rather	indicating	that	the	imagination	supplies	intuitions in	the	absence	of	their	objects, and	does	so	most	clearly	in	the	case	of	dreams	and	delusions. We are left	with the following situation. SPD is perhaps suggested by the definition of intuition in the Stufenleiter as an immediate, singular, and conscious relation to an object (A320/B376-7), as	well	as	by	the	initial	definition	of	intuition	in	the Prolegomena (4:281). In contrast, Kant's	further	remarks	concerning	intuition	in	the Prolegomena, as	well	as	his	remarks on	dreams	and	hallucinations	in	the	Refutation, coupled	with	his	many	statements	regarding the	nature	and	limits	of	the	imagination, strongly	suggests	that	he	holds	only	a	much	weaker position, where	it	is	only	the	sensory	qualities	to	which	the	subject	previously	needs	to	have been	exposed, not	an	object	which	possesses	them	all	–	viz. WPD. In	the	next	section	I argue	that	SPD is, at	least, compatible with	Kant's	account	of empirical intuition, and	may	in	fact	be	the	more	preferable	position	to	that	of	WPD when	more	systematic considerations	are	taken	into	account. 19 Kant	states	the	causal	criterion	thusly, "That	which	is	bound	up	with	the	material	conditions	of	experience, that	is, with	sensation, is	actual	[wirklich]" (A218/B266). In	the	third	note	to	the	Refutation	of Idealism	Kant	appears to reemphasize	this	by	saying, "Whether	this	or	that	supposed	experience	be	not	purely	imaginary, must	be	ascertained from	its	special	determinations, and	through	its	congruence	with the	criteria	of	all	actual	experience	[wirklichen Erfahrung]"	(B278-79). Pereboom	(1988)	relies	heavily	on	this	criterion	to	show	how	Kant	grounds	the	actuality	of objects	represented	in	experience. See	pp. 326, 333–5. Roche	(2011)	also	relies	heavily	on	this	passage	to	argue that	Kant	must	deny	that	intuition	is, as	a	rule, strongly	presence-dependent. 20 Allais	stresses	this	in	her	analysis	of	this	passage; cf. Allais	(2011), 395, note. 16. For	criticism	of	this	kind	of	move see	Grüne	(2009), 42-3. August	26, 2015 9	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear 3 Confusing	the	Inner	with	the	Outer A series	of	notes, or	"reflexionen," taken	in	1790	as	commentary	on	(or	perhaps	preparation	for) a	series	of	conversations	with	Kant's	former	student	Johann	Gottfried	Carl	Christian	Kiesewetter, present	different	attempts	by	Kant	to	elaborate	ideas	connected	with	his	Refutation	of	Idealism, and	specifically, with	the	connection	between	the	having	of	an	outer	intuition	and	the	existence of	the	object	so	intuited.21 First, Kant	clearly	distinguishes	between	sensing	and	imagining. For	example, he	says, We	have	two	sorts	of	intuition: sensible	intuition, for	which	the	object	must	be represented	as	present, and	an	imagining	as	intuition	without	the	presence	of	the object. The	imagining, if	one	is	conscious	of	it	as	such, can	also	be	considered	as inner	sensible	intuition	(18:619). Interestingly, Kant	says	that	though	an	imagining	is	an	intuition, it	is	an	"inner	sensible	intuition." Why	does	he	need	to	make	this	point? If	an	imagining	of	a	spatial	object, and	a	sensing	of	it	are both	on	par	as	intuitions, then	why	would	it	need	pointing	out	that	imaginings	are inner intuitions? This	point	is	especially	problematic	given	Kant's	repeated	insistence	that	inner	representations	exist	only	in	time	and	not	in	space, and	that	to	think	otherwise	is	"self-contradictory."22 Kant	goes	on to	address the	problem	of	hallucination, or	more	broadly, any involuntary imagining, which	might	lead	one	to	have	false	beliefs	concerning	how	things	are. Kant	suggests that	the	problem	with	such	imaginings	is	primarily	epistemic	and	doxastic-we	cannot	always tell	when	we	are	having	a	genuinely	outer	intuition	or	merely	the	appearance	of	one. the	question	arises, whether	that	intuition	which	has	the	form	of	outer	sense, like	an imagining	(in	dreams	or	in	a	fever), is	so	identical	to	that	which	also	has	an	object of	outer	sense	that	the	two	cannot	be	distinguished	from	each	other. The	answer	is that	in	this	condition	of	imagining	it	[i.e. the	real]	certainly	cannot	be	distinguished [from	the imaginary], for this is	a	deception	of the	power	of judgment; but the question	is	properly	whether	it	cannot	be	distinguished	in	general, i.e., whether	one cannot	be	conscious	that	the	one	is	an	intuition	of	the	senses	[Sinnenanschauung], the	other	to	be	sure	a	sensible	intuition	[sinnliche	Anschauung], but	only	in	an imagining, for	which	no	object	outside	the	representation	is	present. The	answer is	that	consciousness	can	accompany	all	representations, hence	even	that	of	an imagining, which, together	with	its	play, is	itself	an	object	of	inner	sense, and	of which	it	must	be	possible	to	become	conscious	as	such, since	we	really	distinguish such	things	as	inner	representations, hence	existing	in	time, from	the	intuition	of the	senses	(18:621). 21 For	discussion	of	the	notes	and	their	English	translation	see	Guyer's	discussion	in	Kant	(2005), note	81, pp. 592-3. 22 R 6315, 18:618; cf. 18:621; R 6311	(in	Kiesewetter's	hand), 18:611-12. The	claim	that	spatial	relations	cannot	be represented	in	time	is	also	prominent	in	the	first Critique. Cf. Bxl-i, A34/B50-1, B275-6. August	26, 2015 10	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear Kant	makes	a	number	of	claims	in	this	passage, not	all	of	which	are	obviously	consistent	with one	another. First, he	clearly	states	in	the	opening	sentence	that	both	imaginings	and	sensings are	(or	can	be)	intuitions, and	that	they	can	have	the	same	"form"-viz. spatial	form. In	this	way both	seem	to	count	as	"outer"	intuitions. One	might	reasonably	then	infer	that	the	difference between	them	lies	ultimately	in	their	causal	etiology-one	is	an	outer	intuition	generated	by	the imagination, with	no	corresponding	object	present, the	other	is	an	outer	intuition	generated	by the	presence	of	the	object	(and	its	effect	on	the	subject). Second, and	perhaps	on	account	of the	first	point, Kant	seems	to	concede	that	an	imagining	and	a	sensing	cannot	be	distinguished from	one	another	via	reflection	alone. This	is	the	cause	of	an	"error	of	judgment"	whereby	we might	be	moved	to	err	in	our	perceptual	beliefs	insofar	as	we	make	false	judgments	based	on how	things	appear	to	us.23 But, third, Kant	also	goes	on	to	state	that	imaginings	are	the	objects of	inner	sense, and	that	we	"really	distinguish"	[wirklich	unterscheiden]	inner	representations from	the	outer	representations	delivered	by	the	senses.24 Finally, just	prior	to	the	above	quote	Kant	says, What	I represent	to	myself	as	spatial	cannot	be	counted	as	a	representation	of	inner sense, for	the	form	of	this	is	time, which	has	only	one	dimension	(18:620-1) This	means	that	representations	of	things	in	space	cannot	be, themselves, inner representations, since	then	their	form	would	be	that	of	time	only. This	claim	is	consonant	with	Kant's	stated position	in	the	first Critique (A34/B50-1), and	is	repeated	many	times	in	the	other reflexionen constituting	the	Kiesewetter	notes.25 Kant	thus	appears	to	hold	an	incompatible	set	of	claims. They	are, 1. "Outer"	sensing	and	imagining	are	cases	of	intuition, which	have	the	same	form 2. Sensing	and	imagining	(other	things	being	equal)	cannot	be	distinguished	by	reflection alone 3. An	"outer"	sensing	and	an	imagining	have	different	forms	(i.e. space	vs. time)	and	are, in virtue	of	their	differing	forms, really	different. Obviously, a	conflict	arises	between	(1)	and	(3). Kant	cannot, without	equivocating	on	the	meaning	of	"form", endorse	both	claims	at	once, though	he	seems	to	in	the	paragraph	quoted	above. The	plausibility	of	(2)	depends	on	a	sensing	and	an	imagining	being	phenomenologically	indiscriminable. Indeed, Kant might distinguish	between	the	forms	of	inner	and	outer	intuition	on 23 Kant	appears	to	hold	a	"doxastic"	theory	of	perceptual	error, where	experience	only	presents	something, but	does	not make	any	claim	concerning	how	that	thing	is. What	is	phenomenally	presented	is	not	itself	accurate	or	inaccurate, it simply is. Perceptual	error	thus	arises	in	judgment	only, when	the	subject	misjudges	what	has	in	fact	been	presented to	her. See	An	§11	7:146	and	A294/B350-1; cf. A293–4/B350; BL 24:83ff, 103; DL 720ff; VL 825ff. I discuss	this point	further	below. 24 Specifically, the	representations	derived	from	the	senses	of	vision, hearing, and	touch; cf. the	distinction	at	An	7:154 between	the	"subjective"	and	"objective"	sense	modalities. 25 See	the	references	cited	in	note 22 above. August	26, 2015 11	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear what	is	ultimately	a phenomenological basis-representations	that seem or	otherwise	present their	content	as	in	three	dimensions	have	the	"form"	of	space, while	those	with	only	one	dimension	have	the	"form"	of	time. We've	already	seen, in	Parson's	remarks, cited	in	§1	above, that this	is	a	not	uncommon	way	of	understanding	the	"immediacy"	of	what	is	present	in	an	intuition. But	if	that	is	the	case	then	(2)	and	(3)	look	incompatible	as	well, for	if	outer	sensings	and imaginings	have	differing	phenomenological	forms	then	they, other	things	being	equal, should be	distinguishable	by	reflection	alone. In	fact, I do	not	believe	the	three	claims	are	straightforwardly	reconcilable. Part	of	the	problem	is	that	"form"	has	no	fixed	designation	for	Kant. Kant	ties	the	notion	of	"form"	to	that	which is	"determinable"	(vs. matter	or	that	which	is	"determined")	(A266/B322). What	is	"form"	in one	case	might	be	"matter"	in	another	case. For	example, a	concept	might	be	or	give	form	to its	content, but	it	is	also	the	matter	of	a	possible	judgment	(A266/B322; cf. JL 9:91, 101, 115). Given	this	ambiguity, I do	not	see	how	we	can	straightforwardly	reconcile	claims	(1)	and	(3) above	by	means	of	an	appeal to	different	"determinable"	or	"determined"	entities. It seems extremely	plausible	that	the	subject	matter	which	is	"determined"	in	the	Kiesewetter	excerpt	is sensation, and	the	determinable	is	the	form	of	intuition. But	Kant	seems	to	claim	both	that	the forms	of	sensing	and	imagining	are	the	same, and	that	they	are	really	different. I therefore	suggest	that	the	best	means	of	understanding	Kant	here	is	to	say	that	he	equivocates	on	the	use	of	"form". In	claim	(1)	he intends the	use	of	"form"	to	pick	out	a	certain phenomenal	similarity. For	example, representations	of	spatial	objects	may	all	have	a	phenomenal	character	which	reliably	causes	beliefs	concerning	apparent	depth	and	breadth. This	would explain	why	he	endorses	claim	(2), in	that	it	might	be	compatible	with	his	views	on	imagination	and	sensing	that	similar	phenomenal	character	might	be	had	in	both	case.26 Claim	(3), in contrast, construes	form	in	terms	of	actual	spatial	or	temporal	extent, where	this	is	not	meant as	tracking	the	phenomenal	character	typically	associated	with	appearances	of	such	extent, but the	actual	property	of	being	extended	(or	located, etc.) in	space	or	time. Thus	the	Kiesewetter texts, though	helpful in	drawing	our	attention	to	issues	surrounding Kant's	distinction	between	sensing	and	imagining, do	not	seem	to	straightforwardly	provide	a clear	and	consistent	position. However, when	we	examine	Kant's	published	work	in	light	of them, we	see	several	recognizable	points-viz. that	sensing	and	imagining	are	both	intuitions; that	sensing	and	imagining	may	be	sufficiently	phenomenologically	alike	that this	would	explain	how	they	can	be	confounded	in	judgment; and	that	sensing	and	imagining, despite	their similarities, are	really	distinct	kinds	of	intuition. 26 Note	that	the	explanation	of	phenomenal	indiscriminability	in	terms	of	similarity	or	even	sameness	of	phenomenology is	not, strictly	speaking, in	the	text. However, it	is	both	one	plausible	explanation	of	indiscriminability, and	seems	to perhaps	be	endorsed	in	Kant's	practical	philosophy, specifically	in	his	discussion	of	the	feeling	of respect (G 4:401), where	Kant	may	be	distinguishing	respect	from	similar	feelings, not	on	the	basis	of	phenomenology, but	rather	on the	basis	of	how	the	feeling	is	generated	(i.e. by	reason	vs. sensibility). August	26, 2015 12	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear Kant's basic idea in the	published texts is that	we restrict the class of genuinely "outer" intuitions	to	those	intuitions	which	cognitively	relate	the	subject	to	some	real, spatial	entity.27 In	contrast, hallucinations, memories, imaginings, and	dreams	are	all	cases	in	which	one	has an	intuition, but	not	an outer intuition.28 Instead, one	has	merely	an inner intuition. Both	the outer	and	the	inner	intuition	might	involve	the	occurrence	of	the	same	types	of	sensations	or feelings, and	thus	the	same	type	of	phenomenology. This	would	explain	Kant's	endorsement of	(2)-sensings	and	imaginings	are	phenomenally	indiscriminable	because	they	both	involve the	same	type	of (merely	subjective)	sensory	occurrences. There is	evidence	for this	way	of understanding	Kant's	position	in	his	published	work. For	example, in	his Anthropology of	1798	Kant	explicitly	ties	perceptual	illusion	to	a	confusion	of inner sense	representations	with	representations	given	via outer sense. It	is	said	that	inner	sense	is	subject	to illusions, which	consist	either	in	taking	the appearances	of	inner	sense	for	external	appearances, that	is, taking	imaginings	for sensations, or	in	regarding	them	as	inspirations	[Eingebungen]	caused	by	another being	that	is	not	an	object	of	external	sense. So	the	illusion	here	is	either enthusiasm or spiritualism, and	both	are deceptions of	inner	sense	(An	7:161; original emphasis; cf. LA 25:61, 281, 1456).29 This	passage, and	the	many	passages	like	it	from	previous	anthropology	lectures, gives	support	to my	preferred	interpretation, for	it	takes	hallucination	and	illusion	to	be	purely inner representations, and	our	mistaken	beliefs	when	confronted	with	these	appearances	as	the	product	of	a	kind of	confusion	concerning	what	is	present	or	represented. On	this	view, hallucination, dreams, and	any	other	kind	of	imagining, is	a different mental	state	type	from	those	intuitions	of	outer things. The	latter	are	genuinely outer intuitions, while	the	former	are	merely inner intuitions. They	differ	in	virtue	of	the	form	of	intuition	constitutively	involved	in	their	generation. A related	text, which	might	further	support	this	idea, occurs	in	the	B-preface, where	Kant presents	a	modification	of	the	argument	of	the	Refutation	of	Idealism. The	issue	he	there	raises also	suggests	that	the	epistemic	challenge	outer	intuition	poses	is	that	it	cannot	always	be	distinguished	from	inner	intuition, not	that	there	is	only	one	type	of	representation	(what	we	might call	a merely outer	intuition), which	may	or	may	not	occur	in	connection	with	an	outer	object. He	says, 27 Note	that	I am	not	arguing	that	Kant	restricts	outer	intuition	to	specifically veridical intuition. The	account	I articulate suggests	that	one	may	enjoy	an	outer	intuition	even	when	illuded	in	various	respects. 28 Note	that	in	the	case	of	a	priori	mathematical	construction, the	object	being	constructed	is	constructed	a	priori in outer	sense and	thus	in	space. I take	it	that, to	the	extent	that	the	imagination	is	involved	in	construction, it	is	the productive rather	than	the reproductive imagination. Hence, mathematical	construction, which	requires	no	existing object, is	importantly	different	from	cases	of	hallucination, dreaming, etc. that	I discuss	here. Thanks	to	Emily	Carson for	discussion	of	this	point. 29 See	also	Kant's	remarks	in	the Anthropology concerning	various	kinds	of	insanity	and	dementia	(7:214-16). August	26, 2015 13	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear Now	which given intuitions actually correspond to outer objects, which therefore	belong to	outer sense, to	which they	are to	be	ascribed rather than to the imagination-that	must	be	decided	in	each	particular	case	(Bxli; note). This	suggests	that	from	the	first-person	point	of	view	one	is	not	always	in	a	position	to	distinguish	outer	from	inner	intuition. One	cannot	always	tell	whether	what	one	is	experiencing	is	a genuine	spatially	extended	object, or	merely	an	inner	ersatz	sensory	object	generated	by	one's imagination. The	admission	of	the	possibility	of	confusing	inner	with	outer	intuition	allows	Kant	to	individuate	intuition	via	the	particulars	to	which	it	relates; in	the	case	of	outer	intuitions	via	spatial particulars, in	the	case	of	inner	intuitions	via	temporally	ordered	subjective	states. There	are several	points	in	the	first Critique where	Kant	appears	to	suggest	that	we	individuate	intuitions in	terms	of	such	relations. For	example, This	consciousness	of	my	existence	in	time	is	thus	bound	up	identically	with	the consciousness	of	a	relation	to	something	outside	me, and	so	it	is	experience	and not	fiction, sense	and	not	imagination, that	inseparably	connects	the	outer	with	my inner	sense; for	outer	sense	is	already	in	itself	a	relation	of	intuition	to	something actual	outside	me; and	its	reality, as	distinct	from	imagination, rests	only	on	the fact	that	it	is	inseparably	bound	up	with	inner	experience	itself, as	the	condition of	its	possibility	(Bxl; note). Here	Kant	seems	to	be	tying	outer	intuitions	to	actually	existing	spatio-temporal	particulars	that are	(at	least	empirically)	distinct	from	the	cognizing	subject. What's	more, the	occurrence	of such	outer	intuitions	in	the	mental	life	of	the	subject	is	a	condition	of	the	possibility	of	inner sense. This	is	what	distinguishes	an	intuition	of	outer	sense	from	a	merely	inner	intuition	that might	be	generated	by	the	imagination, as	in	a	case	of	hallucination. The	contrast	Kant	makes between	intuitions	of	spatio-temporal	particulars	(i.e. genuinely	outer	intuitions)	and	inner	intuitions	generated	by	imagination	suggests	that	intuitions	of	actual	spatio-temporal	particulars	are genuinely	different	from	intuitions	generated	by	the	power	of	imagination, even	when	one	cannot	subjectively	discriminate	between	them. Kant	distinguishes	between	genuine	experiences and	mere	imagination	of	spatial	particulars	in	the	Refutation	as	well. The	proof	that	is	demanded	must	therefore	establish	that	we	have experience and not	merely imagination of	outer	things	(B275; original	emphasis). If this is	correct, then	we	can	see	why, in	the	Kiesewetter	notes, Kant	would	endorse	claims (2)	and	(3)-that	sensing	and	imagining	(other	things	being	equal)	cannot	be	distinguished	by reflection	alone, and	that	an	"outer"	sensing	and	an	imagining	differ in	virtue	of their	different	constitutive	forms	(space	vs. time). We	can	even, at	least	to	a	limited	extent, understand August	26, 2015 14	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear these	claims	consistently	with	claim	(1)-that	an	"outer"	sensing	and	a	putatively	"outer"	imagining	are	both	cases	of	intuition, and	thus	have	a	"form"	which	determines	its	sensory	content. However, their	specific	forms, or	modes	of	determination, differ. Imaginings	are, on	the	above interpretation, intuitions. But	they	are	ultimately inner rather	than	outer	intuitions. This	interpretation	gets	us	as	close	as	I think	is	possible	to	the	points	being	made	in	the	Kisewetter	notes, without	generating	the	unwanted	inconsistency. I thus	suggest	that	Kant's	considered	position	is	that	perceptual	representations	of	external objects	are	not	merely	causally	distinguishable	from	representations	generated	by	the	imagination, but	are	instances	of	genuinely	different	representational	types	than	those	which	are	the product	of	hallucination, dreams, or	other	kinds	of	imagining. Otherwise, Kant	would	not	need to	repeatedly	distinguish	sensation	from	imagination, or	outer	intuition	from	inner. He	could	instead	have	simply	held	that	there	is	one	type	of	representation	which	may	have	different	causes, either	external	or	internal. But	this	seems	to	be	exactly	the	position	he	denies. Kant	does	not locate	the	problem	with	imagination	in	the	difficulty	of	connecting	a	particular	representational type-intuition-with	its	causal	source, and	using	this	causal	source	as	the	criterion	for	determining	whether	an	intuition	is	inner	or	outer. Instead, he	argues	that	the	epistemic	difficulty for	intuition	lies	in	the	fact	that	distinct	representational	state	types	(outer	vs. inner	intuitions) have	reflectively	indistinguishable	phenomenology, which	leads	to	errors	in	judgment	regarding what	actually	appears	to	one. So, in	any	particular	case, we	must	rely	on	how	our	experience of	the	object	causally	coheres	with	the	other	objects	we	experience. An	obvious	objection	might	seem	to	loom	for	the	above	account. It	is	surely	the	case	that one	can	have	a	hallucination	concerning	a	spatial	object, e.g. the	Macbeth	case	–	"is this	a dagger	which	I see	before	me?". Further, it	seems	that	in	hallucination	of	a	spatially	extended object	(or	a	dream	or	imagining	of	it)	there	are	spatial	properties	that	might	ostensibly	be	thought to	be	part	of	or	present	in	the	hallucination, such	as	relative	spatial	position	(e.g. Macbeth	asks if	the	dagger	is before, in	the	sense	of being	in	front	of, him). On	the	account	I have	suggested, hallucinations	are	inner	intuitions, which	have	only	temporal	form	(A34/B50ff), and	thus	lack spatial	properties, including	relative	spatial	properties. So	how	could	a	merely	inner	intuition be	a	hallucination	of	something	in	space? I believe	that	the	account	I ascribe	to	Kant	can	make	two	points	in	reply. First, Kant	seems	to think	that	hallucination	and	perception	may	well	share	the	same	(or	similar)	sensory	character, which is to say that the	very same	kind	of inner sensations (as	modifications	of the subject) may	be	involved	in	each	kind	of	state. This	may	be	the	best	explanation	of	their	phenomenal indiscriminability. But, as	I discussed	above, Kant	seems	to	reject	the	idea	that	phenomenal indiscriminability	between	the	inner	and	outer	entails	that	the	same	form	of	intuition	is	in	play. In	fact, given	his	denial	that	space	could	be	the	form	of	inner	sense	(A34/B350), Kantmust reject such	a	claim. Otherwise	he	would	have	been	able	to	refute	dogmatic	and	skeptical	idealism on	phenomenological	grounds	alone. Both	dogmatic	and	skeptical	idealism, on	Kant's	view, assume	that	objects	in	space	are	merely	appearances	in	inner	sense	(A370-1; B274-5). But, as August	26, 2015 15	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear the	complex	arguments	of	both	the	Fourth	Paralogism	and	the	Refutation	of	Idealism	indicate, Kant	never	took	phenomenological	considerations	as	arguing	against	the	idealist	position. If anything, they	were	arguments for skeptical	or	dogmatic	idealism. Second, since, as I discussed	above, Kant	endorses	a	doxastic theory	of	perceptual	error, and	since	he	grounds	the	existence	of	perceptual	error	at	least	in	part	on	the	influence	(perhaps causal)	of	sensibility	on	the	understanding	(A294/B350-1; cf. A293–4/B350; cf. the	references cited	in	note 23 above.), he	has	ample	resources	to	argue	that	hallucination	involves	an	important	doxastic	aspect. In	the	Macbeth	example, Macbeth	is	enjoying	a	mental	state	whose phenomenal	properties	are	similar	to	those	he	would	enjoy	were	it	the	fact	that	he	was	seeing a	dagger, and	it	may	well	be	the	case	that	these	sensory	features	are	causing	him	to	have	a	mistaken	belief	–	viz. that	there	is	a	dagger	he	sees	before	him. Whether	he	is	in	fact	enjoying	an experience	that	is	identical	to	one	in	which	he	sees	a	dagger	is	very	much	an	open	question. He may	be. But	it	is	also	the	case	that	he	may	not	be, and	that	the	causal	influence	of	his	sensibility on	his	doxastic	processes	has	moved	him	to	the	belief	that	he is seeing	a	dagger, even	though his	experience	may	be, in	many	ways	very	different	from	a	perceptual	experience	of	a	dagger	– e.g. by	being	a	merely	inner	intuition. Assuming	that	the	causal	influence	of	sensibility	on	the	understanding	is	to	be	understood at	least	partly	in	terms	of	similarity	in	the	type	of	sensation(s)	present	to	inner	and	outer	sense, Kant	seems	to	allow	that	there	are	phenomenal	similarities, based	on	an	at	least	partial	identity between types	of	phenomenal	properties, between	hallucination	and	perception, while	also allowing	that	there	may	be	phenomenal	differences	between	the	two	kinds	of	intuition	that	one is	not	always	in	a	position	to	reflectively	distinguish. The	phenomenal	similarities	form	part	of a	causal	or	quasi-causal	explanation	of	a	subject's	susceptibility	to	make	erroneous	judgments concerning	what	kind	of	experience	she is	having. Hence, her	report	on	the	content	of	her experience	may	well	be	that	it	is	of	some	outer	object, when	in	fact	it	is	merely	an	inner	intuition. One	might	object, at	this	point, that	too	little	is	being	left	to	the	object	of	outer	intuition to	think	that	it	could	plausibly	be	present	to	the	experiencing	subject	when	she	is	in	the	good case. After	all, the	presence	(or	possibility)	of	the	same	sensory	modifications	in	both	cases, might	suggest	that	the	outer	object	drops	out	or	is	"screened	off"	from	our	awareness, because it	doesn't	play	a	sufficient	role	in	constituting	the	phenomenal	character	of	the	intuition.30 I think	there	are	at	least	two	defensible	replies	on	behalf	of	Kant's	view	here. First, while there	may	be	some	phenomenal	property types that	are shared	by	both the inner	and	outer intuitions, there	is	not	a	total	match	between	the	two. Hence	there	is	at	least	some	role	for	the relevant	objects	in	constituting	the	phenomenal	character	of	the	relevant	intuitions. This	may seem	ad	hoc, but	it	is	important	to	remember	that	Kant	apparently	has	principled	grounds	to deny	that	phenomenal	character	is	the	same	in	both	cases, because	he	denies	that	there	is	the same	constitutive	form	of	intuition	present	in	both	cases	(space	vs. time). Further, we	might	want 30 For	discussion	of	such	"screening	off"	worries	in	the	contemporary	literature	see	Martin	(2004), 60-70; Martin	(2006), 369-70; Nudds	and	O'Callaghan	(2009), 338. August	26, 2015 16	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear to	deny	that	Kant	attributes	phenomenal	character	to	spatial	or	temporal	representation	at	all, restricting	it	only	to	sensory	representation, which	is	ordered	by	space	and	time. The	content of	inner	and	outer	intuition	would	then	differ	on	some	non-phenomenal	basis, which	might	be sufficient	to	avoid	the	worry	of	the	outer	object's	being	"screened	off". Second, it	is	not	at	all	clear	that, for	Kant, the	relevant	way	in	which	objects	are	"present"	to us	in	perception	is	to	be	ultimately	understood	in	phenomenological	terms, and	thus	in	terms of	the	(sensory)	phenomenal	character	of	the	relevant	intuition	or	mental	state. Certainly	this is	not	true	for	the	way	in	which	mathematically	constructed	objects	are	"present"	to	us	in	pure intuition.31 Even	if	we	do	require	that	the	intelligibility	of	any	existing	object's	being	present to	the	mind	in	the	intuition	of	it	must	depend	on	its	being sensibly present	(surely	an	attractive thought), the	explanatory	role	of	its	specifically	sensory	character	may	be	rather	superficial. For example, it	may	be	that	the	way	in	which	intuition	makes	something	present	does	not	consist	in its	revealing	a	special	class	of	properties, so	much	as	revealing	the	metaphysical	(as	opposed	to merely	logical)	compossibility	of	whatever	properties	may	be	presented	in	intuition.32 I briefly discuss	this	point	in	further	detail	in	the	final	section. While	the	position	I have	suggested	does	not	resolve	every	issue	raised	by	the	texts, it	makes good	sense	of	a	wide	variety	of	texts, relies	primarily	on	clear	statements	in	published	works such	as	the Prolegomena and Anthropology rather	than	solely	on	statements	in	Kant's	notes, and	evinces the	proper	charity in rendering	Kant's stated	positions	concerning intuition	and imagination	coherent. If	this	account	is	correct	then	two	further	points	are	relevant. First, the	above	account	is	not only	compatible	with, but	in	fact	entails, SPD as	opposed	to	WPD.	On	the	above	account	one cannot	have	an	outer	intuition	without	there	being	something	in	space	that	one	intuits. Imaginings, which	include	memories, hallucinations, dreams, and	the	like, are	all	inner	intuitions. Something	is	thus	made	present	to	the	mind	in	these	cases, but	it	is	merely	sensory. Thus, for	the	purposes	of	the	relationalist's	reading	of	the	Kantian	notion	of	immediate	presence, we	have	at	least	shown	that	ascribing	SPD to	Kant	is	compatible	with	his	views	(and	the texts)	concerning	imagination, hallucination, and	dreams. Thus	SPD is	compatible	with	two	of the	most	significant	difficulties	for	this	position	–	viz. that	Kant	allows	that	the	faculty	of	imagination	generates	intuitions, and	that	members	of	the	class	of	imaginings	(including	dreams	and hallucinations)	are	reflectively	indistinguishable	from	genuine	sensings. Second, the	coherence	of	the	proposed	account	requires	that	we	reject	a	reading	of	the	difference	between	the	forms	of	inner	and	outer	sense	(i.e. time	and	space)	that	ultimately	locates 31 Again, there	is	the	relevant	question	here	of	how	much	we	should	separate	or	connect	phenomenal	character	with sensation	and	feeling. 32 This	puts	Kant's	view	in	stark	contrast	to	contemporary	views	of	perception	which	aim	to	explain	the	mind's	grasp of the	objective	world in terms	of its	grasp	of the	specifically sensory qualities	of the	world (e.g. colors, sounds, tastes, and	smells). See	Campbell	(2002), chs. 6-7. Campbell	construes	such	sensory	experience	as	fundamentally important	for	objective	thought	because	it	is	our	only	route	to	"the	qualitative	categorical	properties"	constituting the	objective	world	(Campbell	(2005), 105; cf. Campbell	(2011), 272-4). August	26, 2015 17	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear it	in	the	phenomenal	discriminability	of	the	two	kinds	of	intuition. If	the	above	interpretation	is correct	then	inner	and	outer	intuitions	need	not	always	be	reflectively	phenomenally	discriminable, and	may	in	fact	share	the	same	(or	similar)	phenomenology. This	is	an	interesting	result, as it	may	contravene	those	interpretations	of	Kant's theory	of	mathematics	which	base	themselves	on	a	perceptual	or	quasi-perceptual	interpretation	of	the	nature	of	pure	intuition	(e.g. in terms	of	the	general	characteristics	of	visual	imagery).33 So	neither	the	passage	concerning	intuitive	representation	at	B278-9, nor	the	passage	concerning	imagination	in	the	Anthropology	entails	that	Kant	must	reject	his	position, stated	in	the Prolegomena, that	every	intuition	depends	on	the	immediate	presence	of	its	object. Kant	may coherently	distinguish	between	outer	intuitions, which	depend	immediately	on	the	presence of	some	spatial	object, and	inner	intuitions, which	depend	immediately	on	the	presence	of	a merely	sensory	"object"	or	state. These	representations	do	not	differ	simply	in	terms	of	their cause, but	rather	in	terms	of	their	form. Only	outer	intuitions	have	spatial	form. In	cases	where one's	imagination	"runs	away	with	itself"	one	may	be	unable	to	distinguish	between	the	two. But	this	inability	to	discriminate	between	distinct	types	of	mental	state	does	not	entail	that	the same	mental	state	is	involved	in	each	case. Indeed, by	distinguishing	outer	experience	from imagination, Kant	is	explicit	in	denying	this. 4 Conclusion To	review, I have	argued	that, contrary	to	the	position	I have	called	"weak	presence-dependence" (WPD),	intuition	does	indeed	depend	on	the	presence	of	its	object. This	account	does	not	show that	intuition alone can	provide	cognition	or	knowledge	of	an	object, but	it	does	provide	the	material	to	avoid	one	central	and	common	objection	to	the	relationalist	conception	of	experience -	viz. that	our	sensory	experiences	(or	empirical	intuitions)	of	the	world	could	be	just	as	they are	and	yet	the	world	be	fundamentally	different, as	with	Descartes'	famous	demon	scenario.34 In	attributing	this	position	to	Kant	I take	him	to	be	evincing	a	commitment	to	a	conception	of	the mind	as	being	fundamentally	in	touch	with	reality, which	suits	his	general	disdain	for	radical forms	of	skepticism.35 However, the	proposed	account	does	not	necessarily secure a	relational	reading	of	intuition, as	there	may	be	other	considerations	which	militate	against	such	a	reading. First	and	foremost, we	need	a	conception	of	the	cognitive	role	of	intuition	that	can	accommodate	Kant's	remarks concerning	a	priori	intuition. There	are	also	other	issues	of	note. For	example, Kant's	views concerning	sensation	may	prohibit	a	relational	conception	of	perception. Alternately, considerations	stemming	from	the	most	plausible	overall	interpretation	of	transcendental	idealism	may 33 For	example	see	Strawson	(1966), ch. 5; Parsons	(1969), Parsons	(1992); Carson	(1997); Friedman	(2000); Kjosavik (2009); Friedman	(2012). 34 See	McDowell	(2008). 35 See	Chignell	(2010)	for	discussion	of	Kant's	views	concerning	skepticism	and	its	significance. August	26, 2015 18	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear likewise	require	reconsideration	of	Kant's	commitments	in	the	philosophy	of	perception. Thus, the	proposed	account, if successful, removes	a significant	hurdle for	a relational reading	of intuition, but	there	remains	much	work	to	be	done.36 References Allais, Lucy. 2007. "Kant's	Idealism	and	the	Secondary	Quality	Analogy." Journal	of	the	History of	Philosophy 45	(3): 459–84. ---. 2009. "Kant, Non-Conceptual	Content	and	the	Representation	of	Space." Journal	of the	History	of	Philosophy 47	(3): 383–413. ---. 2010. "Kant's	Argument	for	Transcendental	Idealism	in	the	Transcendental	Aesthetic." Proceedings	of	the	Aristotelian	Society 110	(1/1). Wiley	Online	Library: 47–75. ---. 2011. "Idealism	Enough: Response	to	Roche." Kantian	Review 16	(03): 375–98. Aquila, Richard E. 1983. Representational	Mind: A Study of Kant's	Theory of Knowledge. Bloomington: Indiana	University	Press. ---. 2003. "Hans	Vaihinger	and	Some	Recent	Intentionalist	Readings	of	Kant." Journal	of the	History	of	Philosophy 41	(2): 231–50. ---. 2008. "Intentional	Objects	and	Kantian	Appearances." Philosophical	Topics 12	(2): 9–37. Baumgarten, Alexander. 2013. Metaphysics: A Critical	Translation	with	Kant's	Elucidations, Selected	Notes, and	Related	Materials. Edited	by	Courtney	D Fugate	and John	Hymers. New	York: Bloomsbury	Academic. Bird, Graham, ed. 2006. A Companion	to	Kant. Oxford: Blackwell	Publishing. Campbell, John. 2002. Reference	and	Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford	University	Press. ---. 2005. "Transparency	Versus	Revelation	in	Color	Perception." Philosophical	Topics 33 (1): 105–15. ---. 2011. "Visual	Attention	and	the	Epistemic	Role	of	Consciousness." In Attention: Philosophical	and	Psychological	Essays, edited	by	Christopher	Mole, Wayne	Wu, and	Declan 36 Thanks to Lucy	Allais, Anil	Gomes, Michael	Oberst, Justin Shaddock, Andrew Stephenson, Clinton Tolley, Eric Watkins, and	participants	at	both	the	2014	colloquium	session	at	the	Pacific	APA in	San	Diego	and	the	2014	Midwest NAKS conference	at	Washington	University	in	St. Louis	for	helpful	comments	and	discussion. August	26, 2015 19	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear Smithies, 323–41. Oxford: Oxford	University	Press. Caranti, Luigi. 2007. Kant	and	the	Scandal	of	Philosophy: The	Kantian	Critique	of	Cartesian Scepticism. Toronto: University	of	Toronto	Press. Carson, Emily. 1997. "Kant	on	Intuition	and	Geometry." Canadian	Journal	of	Philosophy 27 (4): 489–512. Chignell, Andrew. 2010. "Real	Repugnance	and	Belief	About	Things-in-Themselves: A Problem and	Kant's	Three	Solutions." In Kant's	Moral	Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and	Immortality, 177–209. Berlin: Walter	de	Gruyter. Friedman, Michael. 2000. A Parting	of	the	Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and	Heidegger. Peru, IL: Open	Court. ---. 2012. "Kant	on	Geometry	and	Spatial	Intuition." Synthese 186	(1): 231–55. Gomes, Anil. 2014. "Kant on Perception: Naïve	Realism, Non-Conceptualism and the	BDeduction." The	Philosophical	Quarterly 64	(254): 1–19. Grüne, Stefanie. 2009. Blinde	Anschauung. Frankfurt	am	Main: Vittorio	Klostermann. Haag, Johannes. 2007. Erfahrung	Und	Gegenstand. Vittorio	Klostermann. Hanna, Robert. 2001. Kant and the	Foundations	of	Analytic	Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University	Press. ---. 2005. "Kant	and	Nonconceptual	Content." European	Journal	of	Philosophy 13	(2): 247–90. ---. 2008. "Kantian	Non-Conceptualism." Philosophical	Studies 137	(1): 41–64. ---. 2011a. "Beyond	the	Myth	of	the	Myth: A Kantian	Theory	of	Non-Conceptual	Content." International	Journal	of	Philosophical	Studies 19	(3): 323–98. ---. 2011b. "Kant's	Non-Conceptualism, Rogue	Objects, and	the	Gap	in	the	B Deduction." International	Journal	of	Philosophical	Studies 19	(3): 399–415. Kant, Immanuel. 2005. Notes	and	Fragments. Edited	by	Paul	Guyer. Cambridge	University Press. Kjosavik, Frode. 2009. "Kant	on	Geometrical	Intuition	and	the	Foundations	of	Mathematics." Kant-Studien 100	(1): 1–27. Longuenesse, Béatrice. 1998. Kant	and	the	Capacity	to	Judge. Princeton: Princeton	University August	26, 2015 20	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear Press. Makkreel, Rudolf	A.	1990. Imagination	and	Interpretation	in	Kant: The	Hermeneutical	Import of	the	Critique	of	Judgment. University	of	Chicago	Press. Martin, Michael	G.F.	2004. "The	Limits	of	Self-Awareness." Philosophical	Studies 120	(1): 37– 89. ---. 2006. "On	Being	Alienated." In Perceptual	Experience, edited	by	Tamer	Gendler	and John	Hawthorne, 354–410. Oxford: Oxford	University	Press. McDowell, John. 1996. Mind	and	World: With	a	New	Introduction. Cambridge, MA:	Harvard University	Press. ---. 1998a. "Lecture	II:	The	Logical	Form	of	an	Intuition." The	Journal	of	Philosophy 95	(9): 451–70. ---. 1998b. Meaning, Knowledge, and	Reality. Cambridge: Harvard	University	Press. ---. 2008. "The	Disjunctive	Conception	of	Experience	as	Material for	a	Transcendental Argument." In Disjunctivism, edited	by	Adrian	Haddock	and	Fiona	Macpherson, 376–89. Oxford	University	Press. ---. 2013. "Perceptual	Experience: Both	Relational	and	Contentful." European	Journal	of Philosophy 21	(1): 144–57. McLear, Colin. 2014. "Comments	on	Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung." Virtual	Critique. ---. 2015. "Two	Kinds	of	Unity	in	the Critique	of	Pure	Reason." Journal	of	the	History	of Philosophy 53	(1): 79–110. ---. 2016a. "Getting	Acquainted	with	Kant." In Kantian	Nonconceptualism, edited	by Dennis	Schulting. London: Palgrave	Macmillan. ---. 2016b. "Kant	on	Perceptual	Content." Mind, fzv191. Nudds, Matthew, and	Casey	O'Callaghan, eds. 2009. Sounds	and	Perception: New	Philosophical	Essays. Oxford	University	Press. Parsons, Charles. 1969. "Kant's	Philosophy	of	Arithmetic." In Philosophy, Science, and	Method: Essays	in	Honor	of	Ernst	Nagel, edited	by	Sidney	Morgenbesser, Patrick	Suppes, and	Morton Gabriel	White, 110–42. London: St. Martin's	Press. ---. 1992. "The	Transcendental	Aesthetic." In The	Cambridge	Companion	to	Kant, edited August	26, 2015 21	| 22 Intuition	&	Presence Colin	McLear by	Paul	Guyer, 62–100. Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press. Pereboom, Derk. 1988. "Kant	on	Intentionality." Synthese 77	(3): 321–52. Roche, Andrew	F.	2011. "Allais	on	Transcendental	Idealism." Kantian	Review 16	(03): 351–74. Satura, Vladimír. 1971. Kants	Erkenntnispsychologie	in	Den	Nachschriften	Seiner	Vorlesungen über	Empirische	Psychologie. Vol. (101). Bonn: Bouvier. Sellars, Wilfrid. 1968. Science	and	Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian	Themes. London: Routledge	&	Keegan	Paul. Stephenson, Andrew. 2011. "Kant	on	Non-Veridical	Experience." In Kant	Yearbook 2011: Anthropology, edited	by	Dietmar	H Heidemann, 1–22. Berlin, Boston: de	Gruyter. ---. 2015. "Kant	on	the	Object-Dependence	of	Intuition	and	Hallucination." The	Philosophical	Quarterly 65	(260): 486–508. Strawson, Peter	Frederick. 1966. The	Bounds	of	Sense. London: Routledge. Tolley, Clinton. 2013. "The	Non-Conceptuality	of	the	Content	of	Intuitions: A New	Approach." Kantian	Review 18	(01): 107–36. Watkins, Eric. 2008. "Kant	and	the	Myth	of	the	Given." Inquiry 51	(5): 512–31. ---. 2012. "Kant, Sellars, and	the	Myth	of	the	Given." The	Philosophical	Forum 43	(3): 311–26. August	26, 2015 22	|